In this survey of Roberto Esposito's thought, Bonito Oliva reflects upon the stakes of reading biopolitics in an immunitary key. After sketching the features of a "fundamental crisis in the sense of coexistence," the author, moving from ancient to modern philosophy, emphasizes the centrality of fear in Esposito's understanding of the origins of community. The importance of fear explains in part the intrinsic relation community has to immunity for Esposito, in which immunity is figured primarily as a negative (...) form of community. In the essay's closing pages, the author shows how deeply immunity informs Esposito's understanding of contemporary biopolitics. She goes on to note Esposito's indebtedness to Hegel, especially with regard to the negative, and echoes Esposito's and Deleuze's own calls for the construction of "an immanent norm of life.". (shrink)

Given the difficulties in Business & Society research to establish causality, one of the crucial tasks in the sciences, a Quasi-Experimental Approach (QEA) is suggested as a research design suitable to a variety of questions in the field. Triangulation is also suggested as a complement to the QEA way to tease out plausible alternative explanations. A recently published study is used as an illustrative example.

IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND LAND (SRCCL) -/- Chapter 3: Climate Change and Land: An IPCC special report on climate change, desertification, land degradation, sustainable land management, food security, and greenhouse gas fluxes in terrestrial ecosystems.

P. KOnig: Einleitung - P. ZIche: Idiographik und allgemeine Wissenschaftlichkeit - Windelband und die Wissenschaftsreflexion um 1900 - G. HArtung: Ein Philosoph korrigiert sich selbst - Wilhelm Windelbands Abkehr vom Relativismus - O. SChlaudt: Philosophie am Leitfaden der Empirie. WIndelbands relativistisches Programm - S. KUft: Windelbands Konzeption von Transzendentalphilosophie und ihr Bezug zur Kulturphilosophie - R. BOnito Oliva: Windelband. KUlturphilosophie und Kulturkrise - P. KOnig: Teleologie und Geschichte bei Wilhelm Windelband - J. BOhr: Im Fortschreiben der Probleme: Windelbands (...) 19. JAhrhundert - T.-H. CHang: Der Wertbegriff beiWilhelm Windelband und sein Konzept der Problemgeschichte - T. KUbalica: Die Geschichte der Philosophie als Problemgeschichte - J. MEhlich: Windelbands Praludien und das Silberne Zeitalter in Russland - G. SChluter: Windelbands italienische Kontakte und Bezugnahmen - D. STefanelli: Notizen uber Karl Vossler und die "Sudwestdeutsche Schule" - C. ZAnfi: Geschichte, Natur und Leben: Windelband und Bergson in der Historismus-Debatte - J.-I. LIndén: Der beseelte Geist: Dilthey als Kritiker der badischen Schule - H. GUndlach: Windelbands Ringen mit der Psychologie - Anhang: Wilhelm Windelband: Blaue Hefte zur Psychologie. (shrink)

La observación del cinismo antiguo como precursor filosófico del anarquismo ha sido abordada por un gran número de estudiosos y especialistas de ambos campos. El siguiente trabajo se propone aportar nuevos puntos de vista a la relación cinismo-anarquismo. Nuestro punto de partida es la figura del protocínico Diógenes de Sinope [412-402 /325-321], cuya heterodoxa filosofía, de la que no conservamos escritos, ha sido objeto de ambivalentes recepciones a lo largo de la historia. Veremos por qué ha sido reivindicado como un (...) miembro ilustre de la prehistoria del anarquismo y qué nuevas perspectivas podemos añadir a esos estudios. (shrink)

In the 1990s, Franklin Leopoldo e Silva wrote several articles on the question of history from the Pascalian point of view. This article intends to resume these texts, showing how they present a complex and structured view on the subject. Reflecting on Pascal’s theological discussions, Leopoldo e Silva shows us how the French philosopher paves the way for a renewed conception of historicity.

Розкрито сутність поняття «рейтинг». Доведено значущість рейтингової оцінки для суб’єктів фінансового ринку, зокрема для страхових компаній, потенційних страхувальників, інвесторів та кредиторів.

Institutions receiving federal funding for research from the U.S.Public Health Service need to have policies and procedures to both prevent research misconduct and to adjudicate it when it occurs. The person who is designated to handle research misconduct is typically referred to as the research integrity officer (RIO). In this interview study we report on 79 RIOs who describe how they would handle allegations of research misconduct. Their responses were compared to two expert RIOs. The responses to the allegations in (...) the scenarios demonstrated that RIOs are not uniformly well prepared to handle activities associated with reported allegations of research misconduct. We recommend greater preparation through directed training, use of check lists of possible behaviors necessary to consider when situations arise, being involved in a network of RIOs so one can discuss options, and the possible need to certify RIOs. (shrink)

Moral subjectivism is commonly associated with out-of-favour theories like, e.g., Alfred Ayer’s emotivism or John Mackie’s error theory. This paper approaches the field against the background of the attitudinal character of morality and religion. The possibility of a brand of moral subjectivism is established which is common to Ayer’s and Mackie’s theories in name only yet still has significant merits. The perspective from action theory and the philosophy of mind suggests that the problem of moral obligation, central to moral philosophy, (...) is more convincingly dealt with by subjectivism than by its rivals: In contrast to realism or even relativism (with which subjectivism is often confused), subjectivism can help to explain the peculiarities of obligation without forcing us to disregard the parallel problem in the field of religion. This finding calls into question the rationale for, as well as the success of, central assumptions in ontology and semantics which the realist so freely hands out in order to make his point: If religious facts and the truth-aptness of religious judgements will not explain religious obligation, moral facts and the truth-aptness of moral judgements will not help the moral realist either. So unless we do not wish to simply cast the problem of moral obligation aside, in future, moral subjectivism must be seriously considered as a worthwhile position in its own right. [in German] **************************************************************************************************** ********** Moralischer Subjektivismus ist ein Oberbegriff für Theorien wie Alfred Ayers „Emotivismus“ und John Mackies „Irrtumstheorie“, die heute kaum noch Vertreter finden. In diesem Aufsatz beleuchte ich das Feld vom Einstellungscharakter von Moral und Religion her. Ich lege so die Möglichkeit eines anderen moralischen Subjektivismus dar, der mit Ayers oder Mackies Theorie nur das Rubrum gemein hätte und doch gewichtige Vorzüge aufweist. Die handlungstheoretische Betrachtung von Moral und Religion mit Hilfe der Philosophie des Geistes legt nahe, dass dieser moralische Subjektivismus mit dem für die Moralphilosophie zentralen Problem des moralischen Sollens besser umgehen kann als seine Rivalen: Anders als der Realismus oder gar der Relativismus (mit dem der Subjektivismus oft verwechselt wird), kann der hier ausgeleuchtete Subjektivismus mit der besonderen Verbindlichkeit moralischer Forderungen umgehen, ohne die Parallele zur besonderen Verbindlichkeit religiöser Forderungen in Abrede stellen zu müssen. Die Rolle und Durchschlagkraft der vom Realisten so freigiebig gespendeten ontologischen oder semantischen Zusatzannahmen er- scheint vor diesem Hintergrund fragwürdig. Dem religiösen Realisten wird man vergleichbare Annahmen nicht zugeben wollen und muss es auch nicht. Dann aber können wir die Erklärung besonderer Verbindlichkeit generell nicht auf Ontologie oder Semantik gründen. Der verbreitete Appell an sogenannte moralische Tatsachen oder die behauptete Wahrheitsfähigkeit moralischer Sätze erweist sich so als wirkungslos. Sofern wir das Problem des moralischen Sollens überhaupt weiter ernst nehmen wollen, muss der moralische Subjektivismus als Position künftig ernsthaft erwogen werden. (shrink)

O problema da corporalidade em Leibniz se vincula necessariamente à discussão sobre o estatuto da matéria em uma Metafísica cuja base são as mônadas imateriais. Veremos que, neste contexto, o material deverá ser fenomênico, mas nem por isso ilusório. O objetivo deste trabalho é mostrar como o campo fenomênico, cujo caso exemplar é o corpo, pode ganhar um suporte metafísico e racionalmente justificado, constituindo o que Leibniz chama de fenômenos bem fundados. Para tal, deverá ser feito um exame cuidadoso da (...) natureza das Forças no pensamento leibniziano e de como elas apresentam o vínculo procurado entre Física e Metafísica. Leibniz on Phenomenon and CorporalityThe problem of corporality in Leibniz is necessarily attached to the discussion on the nature of matter in a Metaphysics whose basis are the immaterial monads. We will see that, in this context, although the material must be phenomenic, it is not necessarily ilusory. The aim of this paper is to show how the phenomenic domain, whose exemplar case is the body, may be metaphysically founded and rationally justifyed, constituting what Leibniz calls well founded phenomena. In order to do it, it is necessary to examine Leibniz's conception of the nature of the Forces and how they could present the link between Physics and Metaphysics. (shrink)

What is discrimination and what makes wrongful discrimination wrong? Even after an ever-rising tide of research over the course of the past twenty-five or so years these questions still remain hard to answer. Exercising candid and self-critical hindsight, Larry Alexander, who contributed his fair share to this tide, thus remarked: “All cases of discrimination, if wrongful, are wrongful either because of their quite contingent consequences or perhaps because they are breaches of promises or fiduciary duties.” If this is true it (...) raises serious doubts as to how wrongful discrimination can be a moral wrong in itself. Also, the question comes up as to who it is who breaches a promise or a fiduciary duty. This paper defends the view that the substance of these remarks is better understood by couching them in a political approach towards discrimination. Against this background, they give rise to real and pressing concerns. Once we conceptualise the realm political along Hobbesian lines as the battleground comprising both the private sphere of the individual and the public sphere of the commonwealth it emerges that discrimination has different significance with regard to these respective spheres. In order to illustrate this, I adopt Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen’s descriptive account of discrimination as „differential treatment on the basis of membership of a socially salient group“ and the common view that wrongful discrimination is wrong because it is harmful, disrespectful, or both. In the private sphere the case can be made for morally permissible cases of discrimination. Sexual discrimination due to sexual self-determination with consequently freely choosing your sexual or romantic partner is the central case in point. Where somebody feels unfairly rejected and consequently hurt neither the charge of harm inflicted nor that of disrespect endured need be justified. No “breach of promises or fiduciary duties” is involved. The case is different, however, when it comes to the fiduciary of power. In discriminating, he who exercises the power of the commonwealth necessarily breaches a promise and a fiduciary duty. Discrimination thus appears to be more of a problem of political philosophy than one of applied ethics. [in German] **************************************************************************************************** ******************** Was ist Diskriminierung und warum ist Diskriminierung verwerflich, wenn sie es denn ist? Dies bleibt ungeachtet der seit fünfundzwanzig Jahren anschwellenden Forschungsliteratur unverändert eine harte Nuss. Larry Alexander, der selbst maßgeblich zu dieser Forschungsliteratur beigetragen hat, merkt daher selbstkritisch an: „All cases of discrimination, if wrongful, are wrongful either because of their quite contingent consequences or perhaps because they are breaches of promises or fiduciary duties.“ Wenn dies der Fall ist, stellt sich die Frage, wie moralisch verwerfliche Diskriminierung dann noch an sich verwerflich sein kann. Es stellt sich dann auch die Frage, wer hier ein Versprechen bricht und seine Treuepflichten verletzt. Die leitende Annahme dieses Aufsatzes ist es, dass man dem sachlichen Kern dieser Bedenken Rechnung tragen kann, indem man eine politische Perspektive auf das Phänomen der Diskriminierung einnimmt. Die Bedenken erweisen sich dann als substanziell und zutreffend. Konzeptualisieren wir den Bereich des Politischen mit Thomas Hobbes als das Spannungsfeld, das die private Sphäre des Individuums und die öffentliche Sphäre des Gemeinwesens gegeneinander abgrenzt, wird sichtbar, dass Diskriminierung in diesen Sphären jeweils unterschiedlich zu bewerten ist. Um dies zu verdeutlichen, lege ich Kasper Lippert-Rasmussens deskriptives Verständnis von Diskriminierung als „differential treatment on the basis of membership of a socially salient group“ zugrunde und mache von der in der Diskussion verbreiteten Ansicht Gebrauch, dass das Zufügen von Schaden oder die Verweigerung von Respekt Diskriminierung verwerflich macht. In der privaten Sphäre kann es nun Fälle moralisch zulässiger Diskriminierung geben. Zentral ist die sexuelle Diskriminierung aufgrund der Ausübung einer freien Wahl des eigenen Sexual- oder Liebespartners. Auch wenn sich der Abgewiesene womöglich geschädigt sieht, wird unbilliger Schaden nicht zugefügt und geschul- deter Respekt nicht verweigert. Den Grund finden wir in Alexanders Formel: Ein „breach of promises“ oder eine Verletzung „fiduciary duties“ liegt nicht vor. Anders im Fall staatlicher Diskriminierung: Ein „breach of promises“ oder eine Verletzung „fiduciary duties“ liegt hier stets vor, da Fälle staatlicher Diskriminierung regelmäßig Machtmissbrauch darstellen: Der Inhaber staatlicher Gewalt verletzt die Treuepflicht, das Mandat unparteilich auszuüben, das getreulich auszuführen er gelobt hat. Diskriminierung erscheint also weniger als ein Problem der angewandten Ethik denn als eines der politischen Philosophie. (shrink)

Resumen En este trabajo se analizan las pautas de elección entre los cuatro paradigmas gramaticales de segunda persona del español peninsular (los prototípicos, representados por los pronombres tú y vosotros, y los desplazados, por usted y ustedes), cuando se usan para indexar a interlocutores específicos, en un corpus de discurso radiofónico de la ciudad española de Salamanca. Se plantea la hipótesis de que los fundamentos cognitivos de las personas gramaticales se proyectan en su potencial sociopragmático como recursos para la configuración (...) de identidades contextuales. Tras clasificar a los participantes del corpus en cuatro tipos de identidad socioprofesional recurrentes en la comunicación radiofónica (locutores, personajes públicos, políticos y hablantes particulares), se calculan las frecuencias con que cada tipo dirige y recibe cada tratamiento de segunda persona. El análisis cuantitativo constituye un punto de partida para la observación cualitativa de los contextos de uso. Tras este se concluye que la elección entre las cuatro formas de segunda persona combina los parámetros sociopragmáticos de cercanía-distancia (que afecta a la elección entre formas prototípicas y desplazadas) e individualidad-grupalidad (que afecta a la elección entre formas singulares y plurales). Tales parámetros remiten, a su vez, al continuum discursivo-cognitivo entre la subjetividad y la objetividad. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to analyze Spanish first-person plural subjects as a cognitively grounded grammatical choice serving various discursive functions. Both the expressed and omitted variants of the subject will be considered, even if omission is by far the more frequent choice in Spanish and the more communicatively versatile one. The particularly vague reference of omitted nosotros ‘we’ – always involving an extension of the self towards a wider notional scope – results in a remarkable variety of possible (...) contextual projections. It can be used to signal speaker identities as well as manage interpersonal relationships through the iconic suggestion of viewpoint coincidence. First-person plural clauses are quantitatively and qualitatively investigated across two corpora of contemporary Spanish comprising a variety of spoken and written genres. It is found that, aside from the basic distinction between hearer-exclusive and hearer-inclusive first persons, a third, intermediate variant can be considered, that of empathic hearer-exclusive uses. These are typical of interactions where involvement of the audience is sought even if they are not referentially included in the subject, as is usual in some varieties of spoken mass-media discourse. Each one of the referential variants is used with different frequencies and contextual repercussions, depending on the socio-functional demands and goals of particular textual genres. (shrink)

"Williams's masterful translation satisfies (at last!) a long-standing need. There are lots of good translations of Augustine's great work, but until now we have been forced to choose between those that strive to replicate in English something of the majesty and beauty of Augustine's Latin style and those that opt instead to convey the careful precision of his philosophical terminology and argumentation. Finally, Williams has succeeded in capturing both sides of Augustine's mind in a richly evocative, impeccably reliable, elegantly readable (...) presentation of one of the most impressive achievements in Western thought--Augustine's Confessions." --Scott MacDonald, Professor of Philosophy and Norma K. Regan Professor in Christian Studies, Cornell University. (shrink)

This is a study of Blondel's philosophy of the supernatural as it appeared only in the dissertation on Action of 1893. First, it reviews how Blondel brought philosophy to focus concretely on human action and what he focuses on in this action as the principle for its dialectical unfolding. Second, it shows how this focus brings him to a radical critique of superstition and any idea of natural religion, since even the latter is viewed as a kind of superstition. Third, (...) it examines how he proceeds to the affirmation of God as the necessary being of action and how this affirmation places the human being in a position of having to choose between saying yes or no to God at the core of his action. Fourth, it shows how Blondel argues from this existential exigency that the thought of the supernatural necessarily arises with regard to the question of human destiny and that such a thought, if it actualized in human action through a gratuitous initiative on the part of God, necessarily entails a revelation, a mediation, and a religious practice on the part of man. In conclusion it reflects on how this science of practice remains a philosophy, as distinct from theology, even though it has to do with religious practice in the most supernatural sense. /// O presente artigo constitui urn estudo sobre o problema do sobrenatural, tal como Blondel comeca por o tratar em sua tese de doutoramento sobre a Ácção, publicada em 1893. Em primeiro lugar, passa-se em revista não só o modo concreto como Blondel fez do problema da acção assunto para a filosofia, mas também se procura discernir aquilo que, segundo ele, na acção mesma constitui o princípio do seu desdobramento dialéctico. Em segundo lugar, mostra-se como a partir deste ponto de focagem Blondel procede a uma critica radical da superstição bem como de toda e qualquer ideia de religião natural, por ele igualmente vista como uma espécie de superstição. Em terceiro lugar, examina-se o modo como Blondel avança em direcção a uma afirmação de Deus como o ser necessário da acção e como esta mesma afirmação coloca o ser humano numa posicjio de, no fulcro do seu agir, ter de optar entre o dizer sim ou não a Deus. Em quarto lugar, mostra-se o modo como Blondel, partindo desta exigência existencial, argumenta no sentido de que o pensamento do sobrenatural necessariamente se dá em conexão com a questão do destino humano e de como tal pensamento, actualizado na acção humana graças a uma iniciativa gratuita da parte de Deus, necessariamente implica a ideia de revelação, mediação, e prática religiosa da parte do homem. Finalmente, em conclusão, reflecte-se sobre o modo como esta ciência da prática permanece filosofia, distinta da teologia, mesmo quando, enquanto tal, ela tern a ver com uma prática religiosa no sentido mais sobrenatural do termo /// Ceci est une étude de la philosophie du surnaturel de Blondel telle qu'elle parut uniquement dans la thèse sur L'Action de 1893. Premièrement, elle revoit comment Blondel a amené la philosophie à réfléchir concrétement sur l'action humaine et ce sur quoi cette réflexion s'appuie comme principe du déploiement dialectique de cette action. Deuxièmement, elle montre comment ce déploiement amène Blondel à une critique radicale de la superstition et de toute idée de religion naturelle, puisque cette dernière est vue comme une sorte de superstition. Troisièmement, elle examine comment Blondel avance vers une affirmation de Dieu comme Fetre necessaire de l'action et comment cette affirmation amène l'être humain à devoir choisir entre dire oui ou non face à Dieu au plus profond de son action. Quatrièmement, elle montre comment Blondel, à partir de cette exigence existentielle, arrive à poser que la pensée du surnaturel surgit nécessairement par rapport à la question du destin de l'être humain et comment une telle pensée, si elle devient réalite dans l'action humaine par une initiative gratuite du côté de Dieu. entraine du côté de l'homme la nécessité d'une révélation, une médiation et une pratique religieuse. En conclusion, l'étude se demande comment cette science de la pratique reste une philosophie, distincte de toute théologie, même si elle traite de la pratique religieuse dans son sens le plus surnaturel. (shrink)